没有什么比（以美元结算的）黄金价格的跃升更能体现出人们对美元的厌恶了。批评人士抱怨称，美元是由一个决心打击新泡沫的央行管理的。金价在过去一年上涨了56%，一定程度上是由对未来财政忧心忡忡的亚洲各国推动的。

过去一年，美联储(Fed)广泛的贸易加权名义美元指数其实仅下跌8%，比后雷曼危机 (post-Lehman) 引发资金逃往美元安全避难所之前的去年7月，仍然高出8%。因此，金价的大幅上涨表明，资金正在普遍撤离货币资产，而不是单单从美元逃离。

在其它“四大”货币（欧元、日元、人民币和英镑）中，只有日元兑美元汇率远高于2008年7月的水平。不过，除了自2008年7月以来中国力图保持稳定的人民币之外，其它所有货币兑美元汇率自2009年3月以来均有所上升。

由此我们可以观察到三个现象：各国对货币资产普遍感到担忧；美元在危机期间的升势迄今仍未完全逆转；自严重的危机开始以来，中国政府决心要避免人民币兑美元升值。

与此同时，传统政府债券市场几乎没有显示出通胀恐慌——美国10年期国债利率为3.4%，而英国为3.9%。与通胀挂钩国债价格的比较，显示出通胀预期有所升温，但没有达到极端水平。高风险债券的息差也受到良好控制——那些已经在担心新泡沫的投资者甚至说，控制得过了头。

奥巴马在亚洲的批评人士仍会抱怨，他在确保美元的长期健康方面做得不够。他的回答应该是：只有转向出口主导型经济增长，美国才能消灭财政赤字。而这取决于亚洲各国政策的改变，尤其是中国。

最重要的是，奥巴马应该说：如果要达成一个让双方都满意的出路，双方就必需合作。一场通货膨胀带来的毁灭并不是不可避免的。但美国重返更为健康的公共财政，必然取决于美国经济的强劲复苏。美国的政策制定者不可能独力做到这一点。他们需要帮助。向美国提供这种帮助符合亚洲各国的长期利益。

译者/君悦
英国《金融时报》 社评 2009-11-16
出處：FT中文网

(原文)MR OBAMA GOES TO VISIT HIS CREDITORS
Ｗhen Mr Obama visits Asia, he does so as head of state of a battered superpower. No better symptom of US frailty can be found than the dollar – the currency in which Asians have invested so much of their people's hard-earned wealth. But Mr Obama can only grin and ask his hosts to bear it. He does not have the means to rescue the US dollar, on his own.

No better symptom of aversion to the US currency – managed by a central bank determined to blow new bubbles, critics complain – can apparently be found than the jump in the dollar price of gold. This is up 56 per cent over the past year, driven, in part, by fears of Asians over their financial future.

Over the same 12 months, the Federal Reserve's broad, trade-weighted, nominal exchange rate index has lost only 8 per cent of its value. It is still 8 per cent higher than in July 2008, before the flight to the safe haven of the dollar triggered by the post-Lehman crisis. Thus, the huge jump in the price of gold suggests a flight from currencies, in general, rather than one from the dollar, in particular.

Of the other “big four” currencies – the euro, the yen, the renminbi and the pound – only the yen is much higher against the dollar than in July 2008. Yet all, except the renminbi, managed by the Chinese to remain constant, since July 2008, have risen against the US currency since March 2009.

What we can observe, then, are three phenomena: generalised concern about currencies; an as yet incomplete reversal of the strengthening of the dollar during the crisis; and a determination by the Chinese authorities to avoid appreciation against the dollar since the serious crisis began.

Meanwhile, markets for conventional government bonds hardly suggest inflation panic, with interest rates on 10-year bonds at 3.4 per cent in the US and 3.9 per cent in the UK. Comparisons with the prices of inflation-indexed government bonds suggest some upward drift in inflation expectations, but not to extreme levels. Spreads on riskier bonds also remain well contained – too much so, say those already fearing new bubbles.

Mr Obama's Asian critics will still complain that he is not doing enough to ensure the long-term health of the dollar. He must respond that the US can close its fiscal deficit only if it can shift into export-led growth. That depends on changes in policies in Asia, not least in China.

Above all, Mr Obama should say, the two sides need to co-operate if they are to achieve an exit satisfactory to both. Inflationary meltdown is not inevitable. But a move back to healthier US public finances depends, inescapably, on a strong recovery in the US economy. US policymakers cannot achieve this on their own. They need help. It is in the long-run interests of Asians to provide it.